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that binds only for large-market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate talent
despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent. If fans prefer competitive
balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap will reduce social welfare.
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1 Introduction
A salary cap is a limit on the amount of money a club can spend on player
salaries. The cap is usually defined as a percentage of average annual revenues
and limits the club’s investment in playing talent. Since most leagues compute
their caps on the basis of the revenues of the preceding season, the cap is
actually a fixed sum. In 2006, for example, the US National Football League
(NFL) had a salary cap of approximately 102 million US dollars per team.
The North-American National Basketball Association (NBA) was the first
league to introduce a salary cap for the 1984-1985 season.1 Today, salary caps
are in effect in professional team sports all around the world. In North Amer-
ica, the National Hockey League,2 the Canadian Football League, the National
Football League, the National Basketball Association and the Arena Football
League have all installed salary caps. In Australia, the Australian Football
League, the National Rugby League and A-League Soccer have implemented
salary caps to regulate their labor markets. In Europe, salary caps are in
effect in the Guiness Premiership in rugby union and the Super League in
rugby league. In European soccer, a small fraction of European football clubs,
known as G 14 and established as an interest group of 18 prominent clubs of
European football, had already brought up the issue of salary cost controls in
2004. The members of G 14 had planned to limit their salary expenditures
at 70% of audited club turnover from the season 2005/2006 onwards. At the
same time the minimum allowable amount for total staff costs of each member
was set at 30 million Euros. According to the G 14 plan, verification of the
clubs’ compliance with these principles should be carried out by their statu-
tory auditors. However, the G 14 plan has never been put into practice and G
14 dissolved in January 2008, when the new European Club Association was
founded under the auspices of UEFA.3
From an economic perspective, salary caps are often regarded as a col-
lusive agreement of wealthy owners to use their monopoly power to transfer
player rents back to ownership.4 Nevertheless, salary caps are not illegal in
the US because they are the result of a freely-negotiated collective bargaining
agreement between the players’ union and the league, represented by their
governing body. The stated rationale for salary caps focuses on two main
1See Staudohar (1998).
2A lockout in 2004-2005 resulted, for the first time, in the loss of an entire season in the
National Hockey League. The main point of contention was that the club owners insisted
on the introduction of a salary cap to have cost-certainty (Staudohar, 2005).
3See Ke´senne (2003) for an analysis.
4See e.g. Vrooman (1995, 2000).
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objectives: increasing competitive balance and maintaining financial stability.
The concern for competitive balance describes one of the most important pe-
culiarities of professional team sports:5 It is a wideheld belief that a certain
degree of uncertainty about the outcome is necessary to ensure an entertain-
ing competition.6 Salary caps prevent large-market clubs from becoming too
dominant by helping small-market clubs to keep star players who would oth-
erwise be attracted by higher salary offers from large-market clubs. Fort and
Quirk (1995) consider an enforceable salary cap as the only effective device to
maintain ”financial viability” and improve competitive balance.
In Europe, the leading football clubs cited the protection of the financial
future of the game as the main reason for their attempts to introduce a salary
cap. Many clubs are facing financial ruin after gambling on spiralling wages.
Owing to its structure, professional team sport carries the risks that its clubs
over-invest in playing talent (see Dietl et al., 2008). Salary caps prevent clubs
from over-investing in playing talent.
Both arguments have been discussed in the economic literature. Accord-
ing to Rottenberg (1956) clubs would not voluntarily bid themselves into
bankruptcy and diminishing returns in terms of talent will guarantee at least
some level of competitive talent. Whitney (1993), on the other hand, shows
that the market for star athletes in professional team sports is subject to de-
structive competition - a process which drives some clubs into bankruptcy.
According to Whitney (1993), club managers will, on average, overspend on
talent that turns their team into a contender, i.e. they will over-invest in star
players. The recent development of club finances in European soccer supports
Whitney’s hypothesis.
Ke´senne (2000a) develops a two-team model consisting of a large- and a
small-market club and shows that a payroll cap, defined as a fixed percentage
of league revenue divided by the number of teams, will improve competitive
balance as well as the distribution of player salary within the league. Moreover,
he shows that the profits of both the small- and the large-market club will
increase.
The effect of salary caps on consumers (fans) has not been analyzed in the
literature. This paper tries to fill the gap. We present a complete analysis of
social welfare incorporating the effect of salary caps on clubs, players and fans.
Using a game-theoretical model of a league consisting of both small- and large-
market clubs, we show that salary caps will increase competitive balance and
decrease the aggregate level of talent within the league. The resulting effect
5Going back to Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964).
6For a survey and discussion, see Szymanski (2003) and Borland and MacDonald (2003).
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on social welfare is counter-intuitive and depends on the relative preference of
fans for aggregate talent and for competitive balance. A salary cap that binds
only for large-market clubs will increase social welfare if fans prefer aggregate
talent despite the fact that the salary cap will result in lower aggregate talent.
If fans prefer competitive balance, on the other hand, any binding salary cap
will reduce social welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines
the basic model. In Section 3, we introduce salary caps into the model and
distinguish different regimes depending on whether the salary cap is binding or
not. Section 4 compares the aggregate salary payments, competitive balance
and social welfare between the regimes. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model specification
The following model describes the impact of a salary cap on social welfare
in a professional team sports league consisting of n (an even number) profit-
maximizing clubs. The league generates total revenues according to a league
demand function. The league revenue is then split among the clubs that differ
with respect to their market share. We assume that there are two types of
clubs, large-market clubs which receive a bigger share of league revenue and
small-market clubs which receive a smaller share of league revenue. In order to
maximize profits each club independently invests in playing talent where the
supply of talent is assumed to be elastic. That is, the level of aggregate talent
changes within the league depending on the salary payments. We regard the
salary payment of each club as an investment in talent where the maximum
amount that each club can invest in playing talent is defined by the salary cap.
League demand depends on the quality of the league q and is derived as
follows.7 We assume a continuum of fans who differ in their willingness to pay
for a league with quality q. Every fan k has a certain preference for quality
that is measured by θk. For simplicity, we assume that these preferences
are uniformly distributed in [0, 1], i.e. the measure of potential fans is one.
Furthermore, we assume a constant marginal utility of quality and define the
net-utility of fan θk as max{θkq − p, 0}. At price p the fan who is indifferent
7We derive league demand in exactly the same manner as Falconieri et al. (2004). Our
approach, however, differs in an important aspect. For the sake of tractability we drop the
contest theoretical part in the revenue function. Instead we use a slightly different quality
function. The quality function q in Falconieri et al. (2004) is always increasing in own talent
investments, i.e. ∂q∂xi > 0, no matter how unbalanced the league becomes. In contrast, in
our model, quality decreases if the league becomes too unbalanced (see also Runkel, 2006;
Dietl and Lang, 2008).
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to consumption of the league product or not is given by θ∗ = p
q
.8 Hence,
the measure of fans who purchase at price p is 1 − θ∗ = q−p
q
. The league
demand function is therefore given by d(p, q) := 1 − p
q
. Note that league
demand increases in quality, albeit with a decreasing rate, i.e. ∂d
∂q
> 0 and
∂2d
∂q2
< 0. By normalizing all other costs (e.g. stadium and broadcasting costs)
to zero, we see that league revenue is simply LR = pd(p, q). Then, the league
will choose the profit-maximizing price p∗ = q
2
.9 Given this profit-maximizing
price, league revenue depends solely on the quality of the league
LR =
q
4
. (1)
Following the sports economic literature (e.g. Szymanski, 2003), we assume
that league quality depends on the level of the competition, as well as the sus-
pense associated with a close competition (competitive balance).10 Moreover,
we assume that the supply of talent is perfectly elastic and normalize the unit
cost/price of talent to one. This means that talent investments of the clubs
denoted by x are equal to their salary payments. In the following, we will use
the two terms interchangeably.11
The level of the competition is measured by the aggregate talent within the
n club league. We assume that the marginal effect of the salary payment (talent
investment) xi on the level of the competition T is positive but decreasing,
12
T (x1, .., xn) = α
n∑
j=1
xj −
(
n∑
j=1
xj
)2
. (2)
8The price p can, for example, be interpreted as the subscription fee for TV coverage of
the league.
9Note that the optimal price is increasing in quality, i.e. ∂p
∗
∂q > 0.
10According to Szymanski (2003) fan demand depends not only on the level of the compe-
tition and competitive balance but also on the ’likelihood of the home team’s success’. Our
results, however, are robust with respect to this specification: taking home team winning
into consideration would result in an asymmetric quality function but would not alter our
basic findings. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from home team winning.
11Assuming a perfectly elastic supply of talent corresponds to a “worst-case scenario.” In
the other extreme case (fixed supply of talent), aggregate talent would remain constant in
the league and a salary cap would improve competitive balance without having a negative
effect on the level of the competition (aggregate talent). The introduction would therefore
not result in a trade off between the level of the competition and competitive balance. As a
consequence, a salary cap would always improve social welfare in the fixed-supply scenario.
12Note that our results are robust with respect to a linear talent function.
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This is guaranteed in our model if ∂T
∂xi
> 0⇔∑nj=1 xj < α2 and ∂2T∂x2i < 0 which
will always be satisfied in equilibrium. Competitive balance CB is measured
as minus the variance of salary payments13
CB(x1, .., xn) = − 1
n
n∑
j=1
(xj − xn)2 with xn = 1
n
n∑
j=1
xj. (3)
Note that a lower variance of salary payments by the n clubs implies a closer
competition and therefore a higher degree of competitive balance. League
quality is now defined as
q(x1, .., xn) = µT (x1, .., xn) + (1− µ)CB(x1, .., xn). (4)
The parameter µ ∈ (0, 1) represents the relative weight that fans put on ag-
gregate talent and competitive balance. Given aggregate salaries
∑n
j=1,j 6=i xj
of the other (n− 1) clubs, league quality increases in club i’s salary payment
xi until a threshold value x
∗
i (µ), i.e.
∂q
∂xi
> 0 ⇔ xi < x∗i (µ). Since fans have
at least some preference for competitive balance, excessive dominance by one
club causes the quality to decrease.14
League revenues are split between the two types of clubs according to their
market shares. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that half of the n clubs
are large-market clubs which receive a bigger share of league revenue than the
small-market clubs. Each of the large clubs receives a fraction ml
n/2
of league
revenues and each of the small clubs receives a fraction ms
n/2
of league revenues,
with
ml > ms and ml +ms = 1. (5)
We denote Jl and Js as the set of large-market and small-market clubs, re-
spectively, i.e. J = {1, .., n} = Jl ∪ Js.
The profit function Πi(x1, .., xn) of club i ∈ J is given by revenue minus
13Obviously, there are different potential measures for competitive balance. We use the
variance since this measure has the advantage of giving nice closed form solutions compared
to other measures (e.g. coefficient of variation).
14Note that the threshold value x∗i (µ) beyond which league quality decreases in club i’s
salary payments is an increasing function of the preference parameter µ because an increase
in µ implies an increase in the preference for aggregate talent.
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salary payments,
Πi(x1, .., xn) =
mδ
2n
µα n∑
j=1
xj − µ
(
n∑
j=1
xj
)2
− 1− µ
n
n∑
j=1
(xj − xn)2
− xi,
(6)
with δ = l for i ∈ Jl and δ = s for i ∈ Js.
Social welfare is given by the sum of aggregate consumer (fan) surplus,
aggregate club profit and aggregate player salaries. Aggregate consumer sur-
plus CS corresponds to the integral of the demand function d(p, q) from the
equilibrium price p∗ = q
2
to the maximal price p = q which fans are willing to
pay for quality q,
CS =
∫ p
p∗
d(p, q)dp =
∫ q
q
2
q − p
q
dp =
q
8
. (7)
Summing up aggregate consumer surplus, aggregate club profit and aggregate
salary payments, social welfare is derived as
W (x1, .., xn) =
3
8
q(x1, .., xn). (8)
Note that salary payments do not directly influence social welfare because
salaries merely represent a transfer from clubs to players. As a consequence,
social welfare depends only on the quality of the league.
3 Salary caps in a profit-maximizing league
Following Ke´senne (2000a), we introduce a salary cap into our model, which
limits the total amount a club can spend on player salaries. The size of the
salary cap, which is the same for each club, is based on the total league revenue
in the previous season, divided by the number of clubs in the league. The salary
cap cap is therefore exogenously given in the current season.
Clubs choose salary levels such that profits (6) are maximized subject to
the salary cap constraint.15 That is, salary payments xi must not exceed the
threshold cap given by the salary cap. The maximization problem for club
15For a discussion about the clubs’ objective function see, e.g. Sloane (1971) and Ke´senne
(2000b).
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i ∈ J is
max
xi
mδ2n
µα n∑
j=1
xj − µ
(
n∑
j=1
xj
)2
− 1− µ
n
n∑
j=1
(xj − xn)2
− xi
 , (9)
subject to 0 ≤ xi ≤ cap,
with δ = l for i ∈ Jl and δ = s for i ∈ Js.
The corresponding first-order conditions are
mδ
2n
(
µ
(
α− 2
n∑
j=1
xj
)
− 2(1− µ)
n
(
xi − 1
n
n∑
j=1
xj
))
− (1 + λi) ≤ 0,
xi
(
mδ
2n
(
µ
(
α− 2
n∑
j=1
xj
)
− 2(1− µ)
n
(
xi − 1
n
n∑
j=1
xj
))
− (1 + λi)
)
= 0
xi − cap ≤ 0
λi(xi − cap) = 0,
(10)
where λi denotes the Lagrange multiplier for club i ∈ J with δ = l for i ∈ Jl
and δ = s for i ∈ Js.16 To characterize the equilibrium, we have to distinguish
different regimes depending on whether the salary cap is binding or not.
3.1 Regime A: salary cap is ineffective for all clubs
In this section, we assume that the salary cap is ineffective for all clubs, i.e.
we consider the benchmark case that no (effective) salary cap exists.
In regime A, the equilibrium salary payments (talent investments) are com-
puted from (10) as17
xAi =
α
2n
− ml(1− µ(1 + n
2)) +ms(1 + µ(n
2 − 1))
2mlms(1− µ)µ =: x
A
l ∀i ∈ Jl,
xAj =
α
2n
− ml(1 + µ(n
2 − 1)) +ms(1− µ(1 + n2))
2mlms(1− µ)µ =: x
A
s ∀j ∈ Js.
(11)
For (11) to hold, in the following we restrict µ to (µ, µ).18 The equilibrium
16It is easy to show that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.
17We denote the salary payments of club i ∈ I in regime A with xAi . Analogous for regime
B and C.
18For µ very close to zero or one the optimal choice for some clubs is zero. Since
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salary payments show that all large-market (small-market) clubs choose the
same salary level xAl (x
A
s ). Note that without a binding salary cap the large-
market clubs invest more in playing talent in equilibrium than the small-market
clubs because the marginal revenue of talent investments is higher for these
clubs. Thus, we are in regime A if in equilibrium the salary cap does not bind
for the large-market clubs, i.e. if cap ∈ IA = [xAl ,∞).
In regime A, the aggregate level of salary payments XA =
∑n
j=1 x
A
j and
competitive balance CBA are given by
XA =
α
2
− n
2µmlms
and CBA = −
(
n2(ml −ms)
2(1− µ)mlms
)2
. (12)
Note that XA (CBA) is increasing (decreasing) in µ. That is, the higher the
preference of fans for aggregate talent, the higher the aggregate salaries and the
more unbalanced the league. The opposite holds if fans have a high preference
for competitive balance.
Plugging the equilibrium salary payments (11) into equation (8) for social
welfare yields the following level of total welfare in regime A
WA =
3
32
(
µα2 −
(
1
µ
(
n
mlms
)2
+
1
(1− µ)
(
n2(ml −ms)
mlms
)2))
. (13)
3.2 Regime B: salary cap is only effective for large-
market clubs
In this section, we assume that the salary cap is only effective for the large-
market clubs. That is, the salary cap constraint is only binding for club i with
i ∈ Jl.
In regime B, the equilibrium salary payments (talent investments) are com-
puted from (10) as
xBi = cap =: x
B
l ∀i ∈ Jl,
xBj =
n(αµms − 2n)
ms(1 + µ(n2 − 1)) + cap
1− µ(n2 + 1)
1 + µ(n2 − 1) =: x
B
s ∀j ∈ Js.
(14)
we are not interested in a situation where clubs are not participating, we choose to re-
strict the range of µ to ensure positive equilibrium investments. Formally, we com-
pute (µ, µ) as µ = 12 − n
3(ml−ms)−n+((n3(ms−ml)+n+αmlms)2−4nαmlms)1/2
2αmlms
and µ = 12 +
n3(ms−ml)+n+((n3(ms−ml)+n+αmlms)2−4nαmlms)1/2
2αmlms
.
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Thus, we are in regime B if cap ∈ IB = (cap′, xAl ) with cap′ := α2n − 1µms .
This condition guarantees that in equilibrium the small-market clubs invest
less than cap. Otherwise the salary cap constraint would be binding for all
clubs and regime C would be effective.
We now analyze how variations of the salary cap affect the clubs’ optimal
choice of salary payments. A more restrictive salary cap, i.e. a lower value
of cap, induces the large-market clubs to decrease their salary payments in
equilibrium, i.e.
∂xBl
∂cap
> 0. The effect on the small-market clubs’ investment
level is, however, ambiguous since
∂xBs
∂cap
=
1− µ(n2 + 1)
1 + µ(n2 − 1)

> 0 if µ ∈ (µ, 1
n2+1
)
,
= 0 if µ = 1
n2+1
,
< 0 if µ ∈ ( 1
n2+1
, µ
)
.
(15)
Hence, a more restrictive salary cap induces the small-market clubs to decrease
their salary payments in equilibrium if µ ∈ (µ, 1
n2+1
)
and to increase their
salary payments in equilibrium if µ ∈ ( 1
n2+1
, µ
)
.19 As a consequence, the
higher the fans’ preference for aggregate talent, the less talent is lost through
a more restrictive salary cap.
What is the intuition for the result? The tightening of the salary cap has
two effects on the investment incentives of the small-market clubs. On the one
hand, a more restrictive cap lowers the salary payments by the large-market
clubs and therefore enhances the incentive of the small clubs to pay higher
salaries in order to ”compensate” for the decrease in aggregate talent.20 On
the other hand, the incentive to improve competitive balance is weakened.
If µ is relatively high, i.e. fans have a high preference for aggregate talent,
then the first effect dominates the second effect and the small-market clubs
increase their salary payments in equilibrium. If µ is relatively low, i.e. the
fans have a high preference for competitive balance, then the incentive to
improve competitive balance is lowered by the salary cap restriction so much
that the small-market clubs will lower their salary payments in equilibrium.
Finally, if µ = 1
n2+1
then both effects balance each other out exactly.
The level of aggregate salary payments and competitive balance in regime
19Note that in equilibrium the small-market clubs never compensate for the reduction of
talent by the large-market clubs owing to the salary constraint.
20Remember that quality is concave in aggregate talent.
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B are given by
XB(cap) =
n(1− µ)
1 + µ(n2 − 1)cap+
n2(αµms − 2n)
2ms(1 + µ(n2 − 1)) and
CBB(cap) =−
(
n(2n+ µms(2n · cap− α)
2ms(1 + µ(n2 − 1))
)2
.
(16)
Since
∂xBl
∂cap
> ∂x
B
s
∂cap
a more restrictive salary cap will increase competitive balance
and decrease aggregate salaries in regime B.
Social welfare in regime B is given by
WB(cap) =
3n(−nµ(1− µ)cap2 + αµ(1− µ)cap)
8(1 + µ(n2 − 1)) +
3n(nα2µ2m2s − 4n3)
32m2s(1 + µ(n
2 − 1)) .
The highest attainable level of social welfare in regime B is obtained if the
salary cap is fixed at
capBmax =
α
2n
. (17)
In this case, social welfare is given by
WB
( α
2n
)
=
3α2µ
32
− 3n
4
8m2s(1 + µ(n
2 − 1)) . (18)
We derive that if µ ∈ (µ, µ′] with
µ′ :=
1
1 + n2(ml −ms) (19)
then social welfare will always decrease through the introduction of a binding
salary cap.21 We defer discussion of the implications to Section 4.
3.3 Regime C: salary cap is effective for all clubs
In this section, we assume that the salary cap is binding for the large-market
and the small-market clubs. In this case, the equilibrium salary payments are
simply given by
xCi = cap for all i ∈ J. (20)
We are in regime C if cap ∈ IC = (0, cap′]. Total salary payments XC(cap)
are equal to n ·cap and the competition is completely balanced with CBC = 0.
21See Appendix A.1 for a derivation of conditions (17) and (19).
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Social welfare in regime C is given by
WC(cap) =
3n
8
µ(−n · cap2 + αcap). (21)
4 Comparison of the regimes
By comparing the aggregate salary payments and competitive balance in regimes
A, B and C, we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 test
(i) The level of competitive balance is decreasing in cap, i.e. CBC ≥ CBB(cap) ≥
CBA.
(ii) The level of aggregate salaries is increasing in cap, i.e. XA ≥ XB(cap) ≥
XC(cap).
Proof. This result follows directly from (12), (16) and (20) and the definitions
of Ik, k ∈ {A,B,C}.
This proposition shows that the introduction of a salary cap has the ex-
pected effect of increasing competitive balance and decreasing aggregate salaries.
By comparing social welfare in regimes A, B and C, we establish the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 2 test
(i) If µ ∈ (µ, µ′], i.e. fans prefer competitive balance, then an effective salary
cap is always detrimental to social welfare.
(ii) If µ ∈ (µ′, µ), i.e. fans prefer aggregate talent, then the highest attainable
level of social welfare can be obtained in regime B.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
To see the intuition behind Proposition 2, consider Figure 1. The figure
plots social welfare as a function of the salary cap for the case when fans prefer
competitive balance (Figure 1a) and the case when fans prefer aggregate talent
(Figure 1b). In both figures, the non-solid lines show the hypothetical levels
of social welfare in regimes A to C, e.g. the level of social welfare in case
the different regimes were effective. The level of social welfare in regime A is
indicated by the dotted line (W a). The dashed/dotted line (W b) depicts social
11
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Figure 1: Effect of Salary Caps on Social Welfare
a) Fans prefer competitive balance
capxl
Acap’
WA
WB
WC
W
RegimeC Regime B Regime A
b) Fans prefer aggregate talent
capcap’
WC
W
Regime C Regime B Regime A
capB
max
WA
WB
x
l
A
Notes: Hypothetical levels of social welfare in regimes A − C: WA (dotted line), WB
(dashed/dotted line) and WC (dashed line). The effective level of social welfare in regimes
A− C is indicated by the solid line.
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welfare in case regime B is effective and the dashed line (W c) social welfare in
regime C. The solid line indicates the actual effective levels of social welfare
in each regime. Imposing a stricter salary cap is characterized by a move
along the x-axis from the right to the left hand side. Remember that regime
A is only effective as long as the variable cap is above the investment level
of the large-market clubs, i.e. cap ≥ xAl . Whereas, regime B is active for
cap′ < cap < xAl and regime C for cap ≤ cap′. Also remember that a salary
cap decreases aggregate talent in favour of a more even competition.
Figure 1a shows the case in which fans prefer competitive balance, i.e.
µ ∈ (µ, µ′). Imposing a stricter salary cap (i.e. moving along the x-axis from
the right to the left) does not affect social welfare in regime A since the salary
cap constraint is not binding for any club. As soon as the salary cap crosses
the threshold value xAl , the salary cap will bind for the large market clubs and
we are in regime B. In this case, social welfare starts to decrease compared
to regime A. This surprising result is because the unrestricted equilibrium in
the case of a high preference for competitive balance is already characterized
by a high level of competitive balance and a low level of aggregate talent. At
these equilibrium values the marginal benefit of increased competitive balance
through the salary cap is small, while the marginal loss owing to a decrease in
aggregate talent is high (remember that for low µ less talent is lost through a
more restrictive salary cap). In other words, there is no need to additionally
increase competitive balance since the loss in aggregate talent outweighs the
gains from a more even competition.
Social welfare decreases even faster in regime C, i.e. after crossing the
threshold cap′. Imposing a stricter salary cap than cap′ (implementing regime
C) can never be optimal from a social point of view because the resulting
loss in aggregate talent is not compensated by a positive effect on competitive
balance, as the competition is already perfectly balanced.
This effect of the salary cap changes, however, as µ increases to µ > µ′,
i.e. fans prefer aggregate talent. Figure 1b depicts this situation. Here, the
unrestricted equilibrium in regime A is now characterized by a relatively high
level of aggregate talent and a low level of competitive balance. Crossing
the threshold value xAl , i.e introducing a binding salary cap for the large-
market clubs will increase social welfare in regime B compared with regime A
because the marginal benefit of increased competitive balance overcompensates
for the marginal loss owing to a decrease in aggregate talent. This is true
until the highest level of social welfare is attained at cap = α
2n
. Beyond that
threshold, social welfare starts to decrease again, as the loss in talent cannot
be overcompensated by the increase in competitive balance.
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Note that if the fans’ preference for aggregate talent increases beyond an-
other threshold µ′′ = 3ml+ms
3ml+ms+n2(ml−ms) , i.e. µ ∈ (µ′′, µ), then social welfare
can also be higher in regime C than in regime A, although the highest level of
social welfare is also attained in regime B.22
Moreover, it can be shown that if salary caps are beneficial for social welfare
they also increase club profits.23 Clubs will therefore never oppose salary caps
which have a positive effect on social welfare. Caution is necessary, however,
since there is a range of the preference parameter µ within which club profits
increase and social welfare decreases through the introduction of a salary cap.24
5 Conclusion
Salary caps are employed within professional team sports leagues all over the
world. As they are designed to limit salary payments, they could be interpreted
as a collusive effort of club owners to control labor costs. On this assumption
one could easily be inclined to predict that salary caps decrease social welfare.
Using a game-theoretical model of a league consisting of small- and large-
market clubs, we show that a salary cap may actually increase or decrease
social welfare depending upon the fans’ valuation of competitive balance and
aggregate talent.
Our analysis shows that if the league is already very balanced (the case
in which fans prefer competitive balance), a salary cap will reduce social wel-
fare because it reduces the quality of the league by lowering the level of the
competition. In this case the gains from additionally balancing the competi-
tion are low. In contrast, if the league suffers from an unequal distribution
of talent (the case in which fans prefer aggregate talent), social welfare (and
club profits) can be increased through a salary cap. The empirical research on
the impact of within-season competitive balance suggests that the second case
might be more realistic.25 In any case, a binding cap will increase competitive
balance and will help to keep salary costs under control. These results suggest
that salary caps need not be a collusive effort but can be an important mech-
anism to increase social welfare (and club profits) within professional team
sports leagues.
22See Figure 2 in Appendix A.3 for a graphical illustration of this situation.
23The analysis of club profits is similar to the analysis of social welfare.
24Formally: if the fans relative preference for aggregate talent is in the interval (µ̂′, µ′)
with µ̂′ := n−4mlmsn3(ml−ms)+n−4mlms then the introduction of a salary cap will be beneficial for
the clubs and detrimental to social welfare.
25See e.g. Downward and Dawson (2000), Szymanski (2003) and Borland and MacDonald
(2003). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
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But why are salary caps not yet fully implemented in the European football
leagues?
Although European club football has achieved economic and financial po-
tential comparable to the US major leagues in the last decade, it has not
followed the example of introducing salary cap mechanisms so far. Presum-
ably, this reluctance is not due to the fact that the dangers of competitive
imbalance and financial instability are unknown among the stakeholders of
European football. The reasons for the past inactivity of European club foot-
ball to introduce salary cap mechanisms are structural. In contrast to their
American counterparts, football leagues in Europe are embedded in association
structures. Every national football association governs a system of leagues,
which is open through promotion and relegation from the amateur level to the
top national division of professional football. At top of the national league
pyramid, the European Football Association (UEFA), an association of na-
tional associations, organizes European club competitions like the Champions
League and the UEFA Cup for the teams meeting certain sportive qualifica-
tion criteria. The hermetic American major leagues operate independently of
association structures and implemented salary caps as an integral part of a
labour relations approach. The player’s union and the owners represent the
two sides of the relevant labour market and the state accepts the outcome
of their bargaining written down in CBAs. Obviously, the labour relations
approach employed by the hermetic American major leagues is not feasible
within the European association-governed football pyramid. Football associa-
tions cannot be compared with the team owners in an American major league
since associations do not represent one side of a labour market. Instead, asso-
ciations are conceived as democratic governing bodies, which aim to integrate
all important stakeholders of football in a certain geographic region including
the players and, of course, the representatives of amateur football.
For historical and cultural reasons European states have left the regulation
of sports to the sports governing bodies to a more or less substantial extent.
This self-regulation of sports is seen as an important expression of European
civil society. However, the scope for autonomous regulatory activity by the
sports governing bodies is by no means unlimited. Recently the application of
EU law has brought about a situation where the sports governing bodies have
found it increasingly difficult to judge whether they are acting in accordance to
EU law. The Bosman ruling of the EU Court of Justice is the most prominent
case where a regulation issued by the football associations, the player transfer
system, was found to violate EU law, in particular the principle of freedom
of movement in the labour market. In this context it is a priori unclear if a
salary cap mechanism in European football falls under the margin of discretion
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granted to the associations in order to perform their duties.
Due to the association based structure and the legal environment the
decision-making processes concerning the introduction of salary caps will be
much more complicated in the European context, as the interests of various
stakeholders need to be properly balanced. Whether the European football
leagues can cope with these challenges remains to be seen.
An interesting avenue for further research in this area is the welfare analysis
of a ”salary floor” in addition to a salary cap. A salary floor is the minimum
amount of money a club must spend on team payroll. Note that the National
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL) and the
National Football League (NFL) already operate with such a salary floor.
In the context of our model, a minimum team payroll increases aggregate
talent and improves competitive balance. A salary floor could therefore help
to improve the impact of salary caps on social welfare. A full formal treatment
is left for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of conditions (17) and (19)
We compute
∂WB(cap)
∂cap
=
3
8
(
n(α− 2n · cap)(1− µ)µ
1 + µ(n2 − 1)
)
> 0⇔ cap < capBmax =
α
2n
The salary cap capBmax which induces the highest attainable level of social
welfare need not, however, be within the interval of feasible salary caps IB =
(cap′, xAl ) with cap
′ = α
2n
− 1
µms
in regime B. We derive
xAl ≤ capBmax ⇔ µ ≤ µ′ :=
1
1 + n2(ml −ms) ∈ (µ, µ) (22)
Hence, if µ ∈ (µ, µ′] then capBmax /∈ IB and a more restrictive salary cap, i.e. a
lower variable cap, will decrease social welfare WB(cap) in regime B.
If, however, µ ∈ (µ′, µ) then capBmax is in the interval of feasible salary caps
IB, i.e. capBmax ∈ IB. In this case the effect of a more restrictive salary cap
on social welfare depends crucially on the size of the salary cap. Formally, we
derive ∂W
B(cap)
∂cap
> 0 ∀cap ∈ (cap′, capBmax) and ∂W
B(cap)
∂cap
< 0∀cap ∈ (capBmax, xAl ).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
This proof consists of three parts. In part (1) we compare regime A and B,
in part (2) regime A and C and in part (3) regime B and C with respect to
social welfare. Remember that regime A is only effective for cap ≥ xAl , regime
B for cap′ < cap < xAl and regime C for even tighter salary caps, cap ≤ cap′.
(1) By comparing social welfare in regime A and B, we derive:
WA ≤ WB(cap)⇔ cap ∈ [capAB1 , capAB2 ] (23)
where
capAB1 =
α
2n
− ml(1− µ(1 + n
2) +ms(1 + µ(n
2 − 1))
2mlms(1− µ)µ and
capAB2 =
α
2n
+
ml(1− µ(1 + n2) +ms(1 + µ(n2 − 1))
2mlms(1− µ)µ .
(24)
Note that capAB1 is exactly the equilibrium investment level of the large-market
clubs in regime A, i.e. capAB1 = x
A
l .
We now analyze whether a salary cap from the interval [capAB1 , cap
AB
2 ] for
which social welfare is higher in regime B than in regime A is part of the
interval IB of feasible salary caps in regime B. We derive
capAB1 < cap
AB
2 ⇔ µ < µ′ :=
1
1 + n2(ml −ms) ∈ (µ, µ) (25)
(1a) If µ ∈ (µ, µ′) then @ cap′ ∈ [capAB1 , capAB2 ] such that cap′ ∈ IB. That
is, we cannot find a salary cap out of the interval [capAB1 , cap
AB
2 ] which is also
included in the interval IB of feasible salary caps for regime B. Hence,
WA > WB(cap) ∀cap ∈ (cap′, capAB1 ) = IB (26)
This shows that an effective salary cap is always detrimental to social welfare
because social welfare is higher in regime A than in regime B.
(1b) If µ = µ′ then WA = WB(cap) ⇔ cap = α
2n
= xAl . Since I
B =
(cap′, xAl ) we also conclude that W
A > WB(cap) ∀cap ∈ IB.
(1c) If µ ∈ (µ′, µ) then capAB1 > capAB2 . In this case, we have to analyze if
capAB2 is in the interval of feasible salary caps I
B. We derive
capAB2 ≤ cap′ ⇔ µ ≥ µ′′ :=
3ml +ms
3ml +ms + n2(ml −ms) ∈ (µ
′, µ) (27)
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i) If µ ∈ (µ′, µ′′) then cap′ < capAB2 and thus the interval [capAB2 , capAB1 ] is a
subset of the interval IB. In this case the size of the salary cap determines
whether social welfare is higher in regime A or B. More precisely, WA ≥
WB(cap) ∀cap ∈ (cap′, capAB2 ] and WA < WB(cap) ∀cap ∈ (capAB2 , xAl )
ii) If µ ∈ [µ′′, µ) then cap′ ≥ capAB2 and thus social welfare in regime
B is higher than in regime A independent of the size of the salary cap, i.e.
WA < WB(cap) ∀cap ∈ IB.
Moreover, note that the highest level of social welfare is attained in regime
B if the salary cap is fixed at capmax =
α
2n
.
(2) By comparing social welfare in regime A and C, we derive:
WA ≤ WC(cap)⇔ cap ∈ [capAC1 , capAC2 ] (28)
where
capAC1 =
α
2n
− ((n
2µmlms)
2(1− µ)(1− µ+ µn2(ml −ms)2))1/2
2(nµmlms)2(1− µ) and
capAC2 =
α
2n
+
((n2µmlms)
2(1− µ)(1− µ+ µn2(ml −ms)2))1/2
2(nµmlms)2(1− µ) .
(29)
We derive that capAC1 < cap
AC
2 and cap
AC
2 > cap
′, i.e. capAC2 is not in the
interval of feasible salary caps IC for regime C.
Analogously to (1), we analyze whether a salary cap from the interval
[capAC1 , cap
AC
2 ] for which social welfare is higher in regime C than in regime A
is part of the interval IC = (0, α
2n
− 1
µms
] of feasible salary caps in regime C.
We derive:
capAC1 ≤ cap′ ⇔ µ ≥ µ′′ :=
3ml +ms
3ml +ms + n2(ml −ms) (30)
(2a) If µ ∈ (µ, µ′′) then capAC1 > cap′. In this case capAC1 is not in the
interval of feasible salary caps IC for regime C and thus we derive that social
welfare is higher in regime A than in regime C, i.e. WA > WC(cap) ∀cap ∈ IC .
(2b) If µ ∈ [µ′′, µ) then capAC1 ≤ cap′. In this case the size of the salary cap
determines whether social welfare is higher in regime A or C. More precisely,
WA > WC(cap) for all cap ∈ (0, capAC1 ) and WA < WC(cap) for all cap ∈
(capAC1 , cap
′]. Note that for cap = cap′ holds WA = WC(cap).
Moreover, we derive that in regime C the highest level of social welfare
would also be attained if the salary cap was fixed at capmax =
α
2n
. However,
this salary cap is never part of the interval IC .
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(3) By comparing social welfare in regime B and C, we derive:
WB(cap) ≤ WC(cap)⇔ cap ∈ [capBC1 , capBC2 ] (31)
where
capBC1 =
α
2n
− 1
µms
and capBC2 =
α
2n
+
1
µms
(32)
Note that capBC1 = cap
′. Moreover, regime C is only effective if cap ∈ (0, cap′].
This directly implies that social welfare in regime C can never be higher than
in regime B. As a consequence, implementing a sufficiently strict salary cap
(i.e. cap ≤ cap′) such that regime C is effective, will always decrease social
welfare.
A.3 Figure 2: Effect of Salary Caps on Social Welfare
for µ ∈ (µ′′, µ)
capcap’
WA
WB
WC
RegimeC Regime B Regime AW
x
l
A
capB
max
Notes: Hypothetical levels of social welfare in regimes A-C: WA (dotted line), WB
(dashed/dotted line) andWC (dashed line). The effective level of social welfare in regimes
A− C is indicated by the solid line.
19
Dietl et al.: The Effect of Salary Caps on Social Welfare
References
Borland, J. and MacDonald, R. (2003), ‘The demand for sports’, Oxford Re-
view of Economic Policy 19, 478–502.
Dietl, H., Franck, E. and Lang, M. (2008), ‘Overinvestment in team sports
leagues: A contest theory model’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy
55(3), 353–368.
Dietl, H. and Lang, M. (2008), ‘The effect of gate revenue-sharing on social
welfare’, Contemporary Economic Policy 26, 448–459.
Downward, P. and Dawson, A. (2000), The Economics of Professional Team
Sports, Routledge, London.
Falconieri, S., Palomino, F. and Sa´kovics, J. (2004), ‘Collective versus indi-
vidual sale of television rights in league sports’, Journal of the European
Economic Association 5, 833–862.
Fort, R. and Quirk, J. (1995), ‘Cross-subsidization, incentives, and outcomes
in professional team sports leagues’, Journal of Economic Literature
33, 1265–1299.
Ke´senne, S. (2000a), ‘The impact of salary caps in professional team sports’,
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 47, 422–430.
Ke´senne, S. (2000b), ‘Revenue sharing and competitive balance in professional
team sports’, Journal of Sports Economics 1, 56–65.
Ke´senne, S. (2003), ‘The salary cap proposal of the G-14 in european football’,
European Sport Management Quarterly 3, 120–128.
Neale, W. (1964), ‘The peculiar economics of professional sports: A contri-
bution to the theory of the firm in sporting competition and in market
competition’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 78, 1–14.
Rottenberg, S. (1956), ‘The baseball players’ labor market’, Journal of Political
Economy 64, 242–258.
Runkel, M. (2006), ‘Optimal contest design, closeness and the contest success
function’, Public Choice 129, 217–231.
Sloane, P. (1971), ‘The economics of professional football: The football club as
a utility maximizer’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 17, 121–146.
20
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 17
Staudohar, P. (1998), ‘Salary caps in professional team sports’, Compensation
and Working Conditions pp. 3–11.
Staudohar, P. (2005), ‘The hockey lockout of 2004-05’, Monthly Labor Review
128, 23–29.
Szymanski, S. (2003), ‘The economic design of sporting contests’, Journal of
Economic Literature 41, 1137–1187.
Vrooman, J. (1995), ‘A general theory of professional sports leagues’, Southern
Economic Journal 61, 971–990.
Vrooman, J. (2000), ‘The economics of American sports leagues’, Scottish
Journal of Political Economy 47, 364–398.
Whitney, J. (1993), ‘Bidding till bankrupt: Destructive competition in profes-
sional team sports’, Economic Inquiry 31, 100–115.
21
Dietl et al.: The Effect of Salary Caps on Social Welfare
